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ABSTRACT 
We show that conventional aggregation of corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
raw scores and its interpreted impact on firm value is less than reliable. Instead, the 
value impact of CSR activities relies heavily on the industry-specific relative 
position of the firm. Firms that distinguish themselves over their peers are 
associated with an increased value. This finding is robust and holds for both 
responsible and irresponsible behavior. Information concerns and portfolio 
construction allude to a possible CSR clientele, suggesting the existence of an 
optimal CSR level. Our peer-effect results are robust to unobserved heterogeneity. 
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Over the last decade, corporate social responsibility (CSR) has become a dominant paradigm in the 
corporate world. In fact, many corporations devote significant attention to CSR by dedicating segments of 
their annual reports and websites, incorporating CSR into their marketing strategy, and perhaps even 
considering CSR when setting strategic goals. Given the increasingly pervasive nature of CSR, do such 
activities enhance firm value, or do they satisfy stakeholders at the expense of long-term wealth creation? 
The academic community seems deeply divided on the topic (see Di Giuli and Kostovetsky (2014), 
Servaes and Tamayo (2013), Jiao (2010), Orlitzky, Schmidt and Rynes (2003), and Margolis, Elfenbein 
and Walsh (2009)), furthermore the problem is compounded by econometric and theoretical concerns and 
differences across studies. 
Current evidence suggests CSR has been shown to enhance the reputation of a firm (Carroll and 
Shabana (2010) and Servaes and Tamayo (2013)), reduce idiosyncratic risk (Bassen, Meyer and Schlange 
(2006), McWilliams and Siegel (2001), and Lee and Faff (2009)), proxy for competent management 
(Renneboog, Ter Horst and Zhang (2008a) and Renneboog, Ter Horst and Zhang (2008b), and enhance 
credit ratings (Jiraporn, et al. (2013)). These CSR related benefits are in part attributable to stakeholder 
management (Carroll and Shabana (2010)), which in turn imparts value to firms (Jiao (2010)), or as some 
preliminary work suggests enhance revenue (Flammer (2012)). Broad consensus on the economic impact 
of CSR  is still missing (Di Giuli and Kostovetsky (2014) and Servaes and Tamayo (2013)). Regardless, 
any potential CSR benefits1 depend in some respect on the visibility of the prosocial behavior  of the firm 
to stakeholders (Servaes and Tamayo (2013) and Cho, Lee and Pfeiffer Jr. (2013)). It is possible that 
reducing the asymmetric nature of CSR information is the key for firms wanting to extract benefits from 
CSR, and a contributing factor to the lack of academic consensus. However, a firm’s ability to promote its 
prosocial behavior is restricted as stakeholders discount any behavior they perceive as “reputation 
buying.” (Bénabou and Tirole (2006), Bénabou and Tirole (2010), and Glazer and Konrad (1996)). 
                                                 
1 For example employee, customer, community, and supplier loyalty; see discussion in Carroll and Shabana (2010). 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2484901 
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Instead, they value altruism. Simply put, the value impact of CSR could depend heavily on stakeholder 
welfare/perception and the markets’ ability to price it.2  
Recently, Jiao (2010), El Ghoul, et al. (2011), and Flammer (2012) have shown strong support for 
a positive relationship between CSR and firm value, while Servaes and Tamayo (2013) and Di Giuli and 
Kostovetsky (2014) have downplayed the relationship or presented contrary findings. We add to the 
debate by evaluating whether the relative level of CSR (as opposed to the absolute level) conforms to a 
generalized positive expectation. Inspired by investors constructing best-in-class or worst-in-class CSR 
portfolios to extract superior returns (Statman (2000), Statman and Glushkov (2009), and Renneboog, Ter 
Horst and Zhang (2008b)), we consider that the relationship between CSR and firm value may not be 
linear based on raw CSR metrics. On the other hand, shareholders (stakeholders) evaluate a firm’s CSR 
profile relative to its peers when investing (engaging). This behavior in turn influences the market-based 
(stakeholder) benefits transferred to the firm and ultimately alters the correlation between CSR and firm 
value. 
Using proprietary data from Kinder, Lydenberg, and Domini (KLD), 3  we show that the 
relationship between CSR quality (the mix of responsible and irresponsible behavior) and firm value is 
ambiguous when considering CSR raw scores. Both responsible and irresponsible behaviors positively 
affect firm value but the impact is more meaningful in terms of the magnitude and statistical significance 
of responsible behavior. Importantly, it is also arguable that CSR activities are, in part, endogenously 
determined by the firm’s environment, which differs across firms in observable and unobservable ways. 
Firm-specific factors such as management talent, firm culture, and stakeholders could drive specific CSR 
activities or policies.4 In econometric terms, failing to account for firm-specific characteristics could bias 
                                                 
2 Whether investors can price CSR is debatable; see Renneboog, Ter Horst and Zhang (2008a). 
3 The majority of the CSR literature uses the KLD database. Some examples include Jiao (2010), El Ghoul, et al. 
(2011), Servaes and Tamayo (2013), and Cho, Lee and Pfeiffer Jr. (2013). 
4 Unobserved heterogeneity is prevalent in a number of governance issues (Adams and Ferreira (2009), Chi (2005), 
and Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia (1999)). 
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the correlation between CSR and firm value if these characteristics are significantly correlated with the 
proxies for CSR. After controlling for unobserved heterogeneity (Gormley and Matsa (2013)), the 
positive value impact of responsible behavior turns negative and statistically significant.  
This result informs the debate around the inconsistency in the literature about whether CSR 
quality has an impact on firm value, as some of the inconsistencies are attributable to unobserved 
characteristics such as management talent.  
In this paper, we propose an alternative way of assessing CSR quality/profile of a firm by 
constructing peer groups to account for the relative CSR standing of a company within its industry. We 
document that higher firm value is achieved only when firms are above average (in the 60th to 80th 
percentile) in terms of their CSR (both responsible and irresponsible behavior). Below average firms 
experience insignificantly negative effects while the average firms (e.g. 40th to 60th percentile) are greeted 
with a null effect. Interestingly, well-behaved firms (80th to 100th percentile) do not benefit significantly 
from the boosted firm value. The intriguing results are found on the irresponsible behavior side. Firms 
with more severe concerns relative to others in the same industry are associated with higher firm value. 
These results are even monotonic in their direction and significant across average to above average 
groups. Overall, our findings support our notion that investors (stakeholders) incorporate a firm’s relative 
CSR position when investing (engaging), possibly inducing an investment clientele. 
Our peer-effect results are robust to the inclusion of firm fixed effects in contrast with the raw 
CSR scores, indicating that CSR affects firms financially, regardless of firm-specific factors, but with 
respect to relative CSR. Our results are also consistent when evaluating the impact of customer awareness 
on the CSR–CFP relationship. 
In addition to documenting a possible clientele effect in CSR, this paper cautions against the use 
of aggregate absolute CSR measures. Our results underscore the understanding that corporate socially 
responsible behavior (doing the right thing) and corporate socially irresponsible behavior (doing the 
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wrong thing) are not perfect opposites (Arora and Dharwadkar (2011) and Chatterji, Levine and Toffel 
(2009)). Furthermore, our findings stress the importance of industry (Fernández-Kranz and Santaló 
(2010)) as we present a significant difference in the relationship between CSR and firm value across 
industries when not explicitly adjusting the CSR measure for industry. We propose analyzing CSR on a 
relative basis in order to overcome these issues, as our peer dummies are consistent across industries and 
remain consistent when controlling for unobserved heterogeneity 
A. Related Literature 
As alluded to earlier, corporate socially responsible behavior and corporate socially irresponsible 
behavior are not perfect opposites (Arora and Dharwadkar (2011)). Several studies (Servaes and Tamayo 
(2013),Di Giuli and Kostovetsky (2014), Bénabou and Tirole (2006), Chatterji, Levine and Toffel (2009), 
and Statman and Glushkov (2009)) highlight this issue and lament the aggregation of CSR across 
categories and between responsible and irresponsible behavior. Cho, Lee and Pfeiffer Jr. (2013) stress the 
importance of separately considering the impact of responsible and irresponsible CSR behavior. They 
show that the market’s ability to process information differs between positive and negative behavior, 
perhaps due to differential information asymmetries and divergent opinions around the impact of positive 
and negative CSR. Some of the mixed findings present in the literature stem from inadvertently assuming 
that positive behavior and negative behavior share homogenous information costs, inverse performance 
effects, and the same cost–benefit tradeoff. As a result, we account for negative and positive behavior 
separately in our study. 
The issues relating to responsible and irresponsible behavior are indicative of the informational 
concerns relating to CSR. The evidence suggests that CSR is mispriced by the market (Renneboog, Ter 
Horst and Zhang (2008a), Kempf and Osthoff (2007), and Statman and Glushkov (2009)). Fortunately, 
timely accurate CSR disclosure or increased visibility in part reduces these asymmetries (Dhaliwal, et al. 
(2012) and Ramchander, Schwebach and Staking (2012)). Notwithstanding these issues, market 
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participants face heterogeneous search costs and processing ability relating to CSR. These differences are 
compounded by the heterogeneous utility functions among investors (stakeholders) (Bollen (2007)). 
Bénabou and Tirole’s (2006) incentive model for prosocial behavior suggests that the motivation behind 
CSR is key to market participants’ utility. They conclude that the relative size of a firm’s CSR should be 
used as a proxy for a firm’s true CSR (Bénabou and Tirole (2010), Bénabou and Tirole (2006), and 
Glazer and Konrad (1996)). As a result, the asymmetric information or information opacity around CSR 
(Cho, Lee and Pfeiffer Jr. (2013)), coupled with the market’s heterogeneous capacity and desire to price 
the complexities of CSR, could undermine the assumption that all aspects of CSR are uniformly, timely, 
and linearly priced. Even if CSR information were perfectly symmetric and freely accessible by market 
participants, the participants’ reaction or non-reaction to the information would be heterogeneous 
depending on their utility function and the relative score of the firm’s CSR. We posit that the asymmetry 
present in the market’s ability to search, process, and value CSR would distort the relationship between 
CSR and CFP.  
We employ a methodology that is amenable to the presence of arbitrary thresholds such as those 
found in socially responsible investment (SRI) funds which employ arbitrary CSR screens based on a 
best/worst-in-class criteria (Statman and Glushkov (2009) and Kempf and Osthoff (2007)). Of the CSR 
criteria employed by SRI funds, negative screening appears to be the most well accepted and simplest 
form of selecting securities (Bénabou and Tirole (2010) and Lee and Faff (2009)) but not necessarily the 
most effective (Statman and Glushkov (2009)). We therefore specifically ascertain whether the CSR–CFP 
relationship is heterogeneous at different levels of CSR following our peer group hypothesis. 
Theoretical models (Heinkel, Kraus and Zechner (2001)) predict that SRI and, by extension, 
stakeholder activity would drive firms to increase their participation in CSR (Merton (1987)). This is 
echoed in the findings of Barnett and Salomon (2006) who document a curvilinear relationship between 
CSR investment screens and returns; with more screens being associated with lower returns initially and 
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higher returns at the extreme ends. Conversely, Flammer (2012) advocates that the benefit of CSR 
declines marginally as investment in responsible activities are increased. It is conceivable that the CSR–
CFP relationship may not be strictly linear, and may in fact be curvilinear. In this paper, we test whether 
the CSR–CFP relationship is curvilinear and find that curvilinearity is indeed present but not robust to the 
presence of peer group dummies. 
Second, although investors’ and stakeholders’ perception of the firm’s CSR may change based on 
new information, an inertia, such as contractual obligations, barriers to entry, transaction costs, etc., could 
inhibit the market from adjusting to it. The consequence is twofold. On the one hand, the benefits of CSR 
may be present several periods after the CSR outlay, undermining the ability to capture the full effect of 
CSR. We address this concern by employing different lag specifications and using a first differenced 
approach. On the other, our peer group hypothesis may suffer as firms would be less likely to experience 
a hard threshold but more of a soft transitional zone as perception of the firm adjusts. These factors in turn 
could reduce the ability to capture a relative CSR phenomenon. Figure 1 displays an approximation of the 
potential impact that shareholder (stakeholder) perception could have on firm value. It attempts to 
illustrate how investors and other stakeholders perceive CSR, as the strength of this perception has an 
impact on the relationship between CSR and firm value. Market participants have difficulty perceiving a 
firm’s actual CSR quality due to information asymmetry and opacity along with the costs associated with 
collecting and analyzing CSR information. We contend that, instead, the market classifies firms into 
groups with similar CSR levels based on their perception. Therefore, a change in a firm’s actual level of 
CSR would only affect perception and, by extension, impact firm value, if the firm “moves” into a 
different grouping.   
<PLEASE INSERT FIGURE 1 NEAR HERE>  
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I. Data and Methodology 
A. Data 
This study is principally based on the Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) ratings 
developed by KLD, which is a proprietary database that rates securities from 1991 onward on the Russell 
3000 according to various measures. The ratings fall within seven categories relating to community, 
corporate governance, diversity, employee relations, environment, human rights, and product. The KLD 
data also rate securities in the alcohol, gambling, firearms, military, nuclear power, and tobacco industries 
according to exclusionary screening criteria. Each category has several subcategories representing 
possible strength or responsible behavior (positive points) and concern or negative behavior (negative 
points). KLD analysts rate firms on their various CSR characteristics annually by assigning a binary point 
to several subcategories within each aforementioned category.  
It is important to note that the strength and concern scores within each category are not perfect 
opposites, nor are there equal amounts of possible strength and concern criteria within each category or 
across categories. We exclude stocks (unless otherwise stated) that have been marked as controversial and 
stocks that were examined by KLD but failed to receive a score, in line with the literature. The KLD data 
have been extensively covered in the literature, being the basis of many studies relating to CSR.5 The 
usual aggregation method of KLD takes the sum of strength net of concern for each category  
    
   ∑          
  ∑         
  
  
 
    
  
 
        (1) 
and aggregates this into an overall score 
     ∑      
  
   ,     (2) 
                                                 
5 See Chatterji, Levine and Toffel (2009), Galema, Plantinga and Scholtens (2008), Statman and Glushkov (2009), 
Jiao (2010), Servaes and Tamayo (2013), Cho, Lee and Pfeiffer Jr. (2013), and El Ghoul, et al. (2011) for the use of 
the KLD dataset. 
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where     
  is the aggregated CSR score for category j in year t. Similarly,          
  is equal to 1 if the 
firm meets strength s in category j, otherwise 0;         
  is equal to 1 if the firm meets concern r in 
category j, otherwise 0. 
As KLD data are binary with a heterogeneous amount of strength and concern criteria allocated 
across various subcategories, it could be misleading to look at a firm’s ultimate score. First, the result of 
the “netting off” process would obscure information, as concern and strength are not perfect opposites. 
Netting off erroneously assumes all binary points are equal and opposite. The number of possible points 
varies not only across strength and concern categories but also over subcategories; it then becomes 
difficult to interpret the meaning of a whole number. Furthermore, comparing and ranking CSR scores 
across firms proves difficult if the range of possible CSR scores is confined to only several integers. In 
this study, each firm is assigned a percentage of possible points for both strength and concern, referred to 
as their level of CSR. This allows us to compare a firm’s performance across subcategories, between 
strength and concern, and across years. For example, if a firm scored one 1 of the possible 4 for the 
strength section of the environmental category, it would be modified to 0.25, as there were four possible 
points available, but only one point was awarded. Following, if the firm also scored 2 from a possible 10 
points for the concern section of the environmental category, a percentage score of 0.2 would be awarded. 
Under the binary system, the firm would have a net score of –1 (one strength less two concerns), while as 
a percentage the firm would have a Net CSR score of 0.05 (0.25 strengths less 0.2 concerns). Formally, 
our aggregation takes the following form  
    
   
∑          
 
 
  
 
   
  
  
∑         
 
 
  
 
   
  
     (3)  
with an overall score of 
     ∑  
    
 
 
 
   .     (4) 
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The KLD data are matched with data from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) for 
the period 1991 to 2009. We average volume (volume), adjusted price (price), and adjusted shares 
outstanding (shares outstanding) for each calendar year end t. Furthermore, income statement and balance 
sheet items are obtained by matching the CRSP data with Compustat through CRSP Link.  
A.1. Variables 
A.1.1 Firm Value 
Awkwardly, CSR is the sum of many policies, procedure, activities, costs, and assets 
implemented fully or in part. The inherent structure of CSR undermines our ability to link the costs or 
measurement of CSR with its potential benefits. CSR benefits might accrue several periods after the 
initial outlay or only once investment reaches a critical mass. Traditional performance measures, such as 
return on assets, might be incapable of recognizing the long-term impact of CSR. We employ Tobin’s Q 
as our measure of performance. Tobin’s Q aims to incorporate the markets’ adjustment to the firm’s value 
with respect to CSR’s effect on the present value of future cash flows and the value generated from the 
asset base. In line with the literature (Bebchuk and Cohen (2005)), we calculate Tobin’s Q as market 
value of assets over book value of assets, where market value is equal to book value of assets plus market 
value of common stock less sum of book value of common stock. Concerns have been raised regarding 
measurement errors contained in Tobin’s Q.6 However, given that Tobin’s Q is the dependent variable in 
our analysis and Greene’s (2007) assertion that “… measurement error in the dependent variable can be 
absorbed in the disturbance of the regression and ignored …” (p. 326), we consider that, in the absence of 
an accessible, well-established alternative, any measurement errors, if present, should not materially 
impact our analyses (Jiao (2010)). 
                                                 
6 For an informative discussion, see Erickson and Whited (2000), Almeida, Campello and Galvao (2010), and 
Erickson and Whited (2012). 
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A.1.2. Control Variables 
Drawing on previous work linking Tobin’s Q and CSR, we include the following control 
variables in our analysis: firm size = natural logarithm of total assets; leverage = total liabilities over total 
assets; turnover = natural logarithm of average monthly volume over shares outstanding at the end of each 
year t; return on assets (ROA) = earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) to total assets; advertising = 
advertising expense over sales; research and development (R&D) = R&D expenditure over sales; capital 
expenditure (CAPEX) = CAPEX over total assets; and sales growth = change in sales at time t with 
respect to t–1.7 
B. Descriptive Statistics 
Table I presents the number of firms assessed by KLD for each year matched with CRSP Link. 
Table II shows the descriptive statistics of the CSR subcategories, while Table III shows the financial 
characteristics of the firms. Table IV presents the shift in CSR scores over time and the average yearly 
score of strength, concern, and Net-CSR. 
<PLEASE INSERT TABLE I NEAR HERE> 
<PLEASE INSERT TABLE II NEAR HERE> 
<PLEASE INSERT TABLE III NEAR HERE> 
<PLEASE INSERT TABLE IV NEAR HERE> 
Figure 2 illustrates firm distribution along the Net-CSR  strength, and concern continuums. These 
figures illustrate the distribution of CSR percentage scores, as computed using equations (3) and (4), for 
the sample firms. The prevalence of firms that fail to score is apparent, contributing to the significantly 
skewed distributions. Furthermore, a noticeable gap exists between firms that do not attract a CSR score 
                                                 
7 We assign missing values to zero to ensure a robust sample size (Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia (1999)). 
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and those that do. Second, firms’ concern scores appear to experience similar jumps or trenches at higher 
levels; a similar pattern is apparent for Net-CSR and, although less apparent, for strength.  
<PLEASE INSERT FIGURE 2 NEAR HERE> 
C. Peer Groups 
To account for information asymmetry, search costs, and heterogeneous utility functions among 
market participants, we define five peer groups based as closely as possible on quintiles.8 In Figure 1, we 
attempt to capture the possible groupings that may exist based on investors’ perception or ranking of 
firms in terms of CSR. Although arbitrary, it is likely that investors’ screens are no more arbitrary or 
simple.9 We define peer groups as follows: For strength and concern, peer group 1 represents firms with a 
score of zero; peer group 2, firms in the 40th percentile and below; peer group 3, the 40th to 60th 
percentiles; peer group 4, the 60th to 80th percentiles; and peer group 5, the 80th percentile and above. 
Accounting for potential institutional and stakeholder norms within each industry, we assume that 
firms are perceived relative to their industry peers and not to the market as a whole. To ensure even 
representation, each firm is classified into one peer group depending on its industry, for each year. This 
mitigates any CSR shift that occurs over time. We further require an industry, based on two-digit 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes, to have at least 30 firms per year per industry for the 
whole study.10 Defining peer groups for industries with small erratic samples proved difficult, as there are 
not enough firms to fill each of the peer groups every year, and not enough variability between each 
                                                 
8 For strength and concern, it is impossible to divide the sample into true quintiles; far too many firms have a score 
of 0, so we approximate as best as we can. 
9 Funds tend to define their CSR screens arbitrarily when constructing portfolios (Kempf and Osthoff (2007)); 
additionally, individual or less sophisticated investors are unlikely to have the capacity for complex CSR screens, 
similar to portfolio diversification (Goetzmann and Kumar (2008)). 
10 The manufacturing (Division D: SIC codes 20 through 39), transportation (Division E: SIC codes 40 through 49), 
finance (Division H: SIC codes 60 through 67), and services (Division I: SIC codes 70 through 89) industries 
qualify. 
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firm’s level of CSR to designate peer group breakpoints. This reduces our sample from over 23,000 firm 
years to 19,605 but it remains well over 80% of our original sample.11  
D. Methodology 
We proxy for firm value with Tobin’s Q and control for firm size (natural logarithm of total 
assets), leverage (total liabilities over total assets), turnover (the natural logarithm of average monthly 
volume over shares outstanding at the end of each year t), ROA (EBIT over total assets), advertising 
intensity (advertising expense over sales), R&D intensity (R&D expenditure over sales), CAPEX 
expenditure (CAPEX over sales), and sales growth (change in sales at time t with respect to t–1). We 
include industry (defined by two-digit SIC codes) and year fixed effects, and cluster standard errors at the 
firm level. Following on from our earlier discussion, we construct a model similar to that found in the 
existing literature but distinguish between responsible and irresponsible behavior. 
Specifically, we use  
                            .    (5) 
We build on equation (5) by incorporating peer group dummy variables     to account for a firm’s 
relative standing among its peers. If a firm fell within one of these peer groups at the end of time t–1, the 
associated dummy would take the value of 1, otherwise 0.  
 This gives us  
                                   ,     (6) 
where      is the vector of CSR measures, namely concern and strength;      is the vector of dummy 
variables indicating peer groups for concern and strength, respectively; and    is the vector of control 
variables. 
 
                                                 
11 We also employ two other methods to define peer groups for robustness but do not report the results in the interest 
of parsimony. 
14 
 
II. Results 
We start by examining whether responsible and irresponsible behavior held separately still 
conforms to the expected CSR–CFP relationship. Following equation (5), we employ a pooled ordinary 
least squares (OLS) regression and regress firm value on CSR. We include control variables, industry 
(two-digit SIC code) and year fixed effects, and cluster standard errors at the firm level. Model 1 of Table 
V presents the results of firm value as a function of responsible and irresponsible behavior (strength and 
concern, respectively). Notably, the coefficient for responsible behavior (strength) is positively 
significant, while the coefficient for irresponsible behavior (concern) is insignificant.  
<PLEASE INSERT TABLE V NEAR HERE> 
This finding confirms our suspicion that responsible and irresponsible behavior may be associated 
differently with firm value. Next, we model the same relationship but include firm-level fixed effects (FE) 
to control for unobserved heterogeneity that could be correlated with CSR. We regress a panel data model 
with firm value as a function of responsible and irresponsible behavior along with control variables, year 
and industry fixed effects, and cluster standard errors at the firm level. Interestingly, once we control for 
the unobserved heterogeneity across firms, the strength coefficient changes sign and becomes 
significantly negative, while the concern coefficient remains insignificant. The inconsistency of the 
strength measure across the OLS and FE approaches in models 1 and 2 is troubling.12 We consider that 
CSR, or at least strength, is correlated with certain unobserved firm-specific characteristics that affect 
firm value, akin to talent or culture within the firm. In addition, Chatterji, Levine and Toffel (2009) allude 
to the negligible value of the strength measures in their criticism of the KLD measures.   
                                                 
12 Servaes and Tamayo (2013) also noted a tendency for CSR measures to be sensitive to fixed effects, although our 
results not only indicate a change of sign, but also a maintained significance. In addition, we document that the 
likely origin of this effect lies with strength, not necessarily with concern. 
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These results appear to contrast with previous work linking CFP and CSR, but we are mindful of 
such an interpretation. We must stress that we account for strength and concern separately and that the 
“net” measure of CSR likely accounts for the discrepancy. Our results suggest giving careful 
consideration when “netting off” the “good” and “bad” aspects of a firm. Ultimately, it is likely that each 
individual CSR aspect (as measured by KLD), whether a strength or concern, affects the firm uniquely 
and over different periods and be interpreted by different stakeholders heterogeneously   
Models 3 and 4 in Table V employ equation (6), which includes peer group dummy variables 
    . These peer dummies capture any groupings implied by investors when analyzing firms along a CSR 
continuum. Heterogeneous information constraints and utility functions could lead investors and 
stakeholders to value CSR differently, inducing striations along the CSR–CFP continuum similar to a 
clientele effect. By implication, the financial effect of CSR would be present as a firm moves across 
striations or into clienteles. We construct these peer groups in an attempt to capture any differences in the 
markets’ CSR appetite. Again, model 3 employs a pooled OLS approach, contrasted with model 4, which 
utilizes an FE approach. Both the models include dummy variables (peer dummy 2 through peer dummy 
5) taking the value of 1 if a firm falls within a specific quintile for either strength or concern.  
The CSR coefficients for responsible and irresponsible behavior are inconsistent across the OLS 
and FE models, with strength significant at all times. In contrast, a firm’s relative grouping, proxied by 
the dummies, not only is significant, indicating certain trenches of the market in CSR terms are associated 
with higher levels of value but these results also are consistent across both the OLS and FE models. It 
seems that above average and high levels (peer dummy 4 and peer dummy 5) of responsible behavior 
(strength), relative to firms with no CSR, is associated with a Tobin’s Q that is 6.5% higher (e.g., if peer 
dummy 5 took the value of 1, Tobin’s Q is expected to be higher by 0.130 and this increase of 0.130 over 
the mean Tobin’s Q of 2 is 6.5%) at a 1% significance level under OLS (model 3). Similarly, above 
16 
 
average levels of responsible behavior (peer dummy 4) are associated with a Tobin’s Q that is 4.5% 
higher at 5% significance with an FE approach.  
The results for irresponsible behavior provide striking ground for greater exploration. Apparently, 
a moderate to high level (peer dummy 3 through peer dummy 5) of irresponsible behavior (concern) is 
associated with a higher level of firm value. A moderate level of irresponsible behavior (peer dummy 3), 
modeled with OLS, is associated with a Tobin’s Q 7.5% higher at 1% significance. The findings remain 
positively significant for the FE model where a high level of irresponsible behavior (peer dummy 5) is 
associated with a Tobin’s Q 6.3% higher at 1% significance. We consider firms heavily constrained by 
restrictive CSR policies are unable to exploit lucrative, albeit controversial, opportunities. Furthermore, 
accessing controversial opportunities is not mutually exclusive to engaging in some responsible behavior. 
We contend that firms that best manage the delicate interplay between responsible and irresponsible 
behavior extract the greatest return from CSR over firms that shun irresponsible behavior in favor of 
responsible behavior. 
A. Intra-Industry Analysis 
Next, we investigate whether the relationship between CSR and value is consistent across 
industries. Again, we build on equation (5) by interacting each of the CSR measures with industry 
dummies              to capture the incremental impact of CSR on firm value per industry. 
Specifically,  
                                           .   (7) 
 Models 5 and 6 in Table V represent the results for the OLS and FE approaches respectively, 
using equation (7). If all industries had similar institutional norms with respect to CSR, the interaction 
terms should remain insignificant. However, our results indicate otherwise. The interaction terms of 
responsible and irresponsible behavior in the transport industry (strength*transport industry dummy and 
concern*transport industry dummy) are significant for both the OLS and FE models. All the strength 
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interaction terms are significant in the OLS model with the transport and finance industries indicating 
significant and opposite signs. The size and sign of the coefficients for the transport and finance industries 
in economic terms implies no association between value and CSR, with only the service industry 
indicating a relationship that might be more pronounced than that found in the manufacturing industry. 
The evidence suggests that simply including industry fixed effects could underestimate the differences 
across industries. CSR potentially affects firm value in opposite directions across industries, not just at 
different levels. 
In Table VI we model equation (6) again but restrict our sample to each of the four industries in 
turn. The manufacturing, services, and transportation industries are most sensitive to CSR and peer 
dummies. Similar to our earlier findings, strength is sensitive to FE, while the peer dummies remain 
consistent, albeit less pronounced, with our previous results. The results of our industry analysis are, in 
part, attributable to the smaller sample sizes, as manufacturing has the strongest results and the largest 
sample. The great number of control variables and fixed effects in the smaller industries could reduce the 
power of the models. Notably, only the finance industry has a marginally significant result under OLS for 
our concern peer dummy 3 that is not consistent with the previous findings, although the effect disappears 
under FE. 
<PLEASE INSERT TABLE VI NEAR HERE> 
Overall, the results indicate that the value impact of responsible behavior is inconsistent across 
the OLS and FE models, as well as across industries. The evidence supports the notion that market 
participants evaluate firm CSR relative to the CSR present in the market. Additionally, it seems that 
above average levels of responsible behavior are associated with higher levels of firm value regardless of 
the estimation technique. More surprisingly, irresponsible behavior may also be associated with higher 
levels of firm value. Our peer group dummies show a consistent highly significant correlation between 
moderate to high levels of concern and high levels of firm value. The industry level analysis indicates that 
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not only does the level of CSR differ across industries, but also the direction of value impact may differ. 
Although our peer dummy results weaken when industries are analyzed separately, the results remain 
consistent. We contend that the lack of power speaks to this effect and that our peer dummies offer a more 
consistent measure of the value impact of CSR across industries when compared with the earlier industry 
results.13 
 
III. Robustness 
A. Curvilinear function 
As discussed previously and alluded to in previous work (Flammer (2012)), CSR may affect firm 
value in a curvilinear fashion, perhaps due to marginally reducing returns. As a result, the dummies in our 
model may be criticized for capturing the quadratic nature of CSR. We modify equations (5) and (6) into 
equations (8) and (9), respectively, to include squared terms of the CSR variables (        ) to capture 
any curvilinear concern, specifically  
 
                                           (8)  
and  
              
                                .  (9) 
Using a pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) approach in model 1 of Table VII, we regress firm 
value as a function of the square of the responsible and irresponsible behavior in accordance with 
equation (8). The results, at first, indicate that CSR does indeed conform to some curvilinear functional 
form with respect to firm value. Both the coefficients of strength and concern are significant and 
positively associated with firm value, while those of strength^2 and concern^2 are negative and 
                                                 
13 Possibly with the exception of the finance industry. 
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significant. Consistent with our earlier findings, the FE results presented in model 2 fail to support the 
OLS regression where all the CSR coefficients become insignificant, with strength again changing signs. 
Next, we combine the squared CSR terms with the peer group dummies. The OLS and FE results are 
represented in models 3 and 4, respectively, in Table VII.  
<PLEASE INSERT TABLE VII NEAR HERE> 
Our peer dummies remain significant and consistent across the OLS and FE approaches even in 
the presence of squared CSR terms. The significance and magnitude of the strength and strength^2 
variables fall while concern and concern^2 become insignificant. All significance is lost for the CSR 
variables in the presence of firm fixed effects and most experience a sign change, while the peer dummy 
variables remain consistent and significant. We do not suspect that a curvilinear aspect of CSR drives our 
peer dummies. However, we provide some evidence to suggest that CSR has a curvilinear functional 
form. 
B. Lags  
The financial benefits associated with CSR might not accrue to the firm instantly upon taking a 
certain CSR position, especially if those benefits depend on investors rebalancing their portfolios (or 
stakeholders adjusting their behavior toward the firm). Therefore, a significant lag between implementing 
CSR and accruing tangible benefits recognizable by investors could exist. The inconsistent performance 
of our CSR measures might stem from a timing issue. In Table VII, models 5 through 8, we build on 
equations (5) and (6) to include a t–1 lag of the CSR measures to capture the potential performance lag 
associated with CSR. However, in the interest of parsimony, we have not reported the qualitatively 
similar results for lags of different lengths, specifically  
                                        (10)  
and  
              
                                . (11) 
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Comparing models 5 and 6, the OLS and FE approaches, respectively, responsible behavior is 
again inconsistent across OLS and FE. The concern lag, L1.Concern, is positive and significant across 
both models. The results suggest that irresponsible behavior in t–1 could be associated with higher levels 
of firm value at time t. In the presence of peer dummies (models 7 and 8), L1.Concern is insignificant and 
changes signs. Our peer dummies maintain their significance and signs across both the models in the 
presence of lags.14 We posit that a dynamic model is likely to represent the true nature of CSR; however, 
the market’s ability to anticipate the dynamic nature of CSR is captured by the peer dummies instead.  
C. Endogeneity  
Any discussion about CSR’s link with CFP will in due course have to address the endogenous 
nature of CSR and firm performance. We do not believe that we can effectively eliminate all endogeneity 
concerns in this study. First, the quantification of a qualitative process such as CSR will undoubtedly 
introduce measurement error, which ultimately leads to a correlation between the CSR variables and the 
error term, a problem that will only diminish as our ability to standardize and better quantify CSR 
increases. Furthermore, it is conceivable that firms adjust their CSR spending based on their access to 
funds, which in turn is dependent on the firm’s financial performance. It follows that increases in firm 
performance lead to more disposable funds, which could precipitate increases in CSR spending. One 
potential reprieve from this endogenous cycle is our finding that irresponsible behavior is associated with 
higher levels of firm value. Although plausible, it is highly unlikely that firms would increase 
irresponsible behavior in response to an increase in disposable funds. Responsible behavior is usually 
costly, while irresponsible behavior is often brought about by inaction, cost cutting, poor management, 
and/or safety procedures. In theory, it is highly unlikely that the results linking moderate to high levels of 
irresponsible behavior with higher levels of firm performance are purely endogenous. Moreover, the 
                                                 
14 We construct a firm’s peer group at time t based on the relative standing of the firm at time t–1. In effect, our peer 
groups could capture any lag associated with CSR, information, and financial benefits indirectly. 
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construction of our dummies represents a firm’s relative level of CSR with respect to its industry at the 
end of the previous year. We contend that observing firms relative to each other reduces the absolute 
impact of a change in CSR and, in so doing, some of the endogeneity, as well as the lagged nature of 
CSR, is mitigated. Nonetheless, to increase the robustness of our results, we estimate the first difference 
estimator based on equation (6), as  
                                          . (12)  
Model 9 of Table VII presents the results of a first-differenced estimator approach, regressing a 
change in firm value (Tobin’s Q) as a function of a change in responsible and irresponsible behavior, 
peer group dummy variables, control variables, year and industry fixed effects, and clustered standard 
errors at the firm level. In line with the FE results, responsible behavior is again negatively associated 
with value. However, irresponsible behavior is significantly negative at the 1% level. This result contrasts 
with our earlier findings where irresponsible behavior is linked to higher levels of value. Economically, 
the result implies that a 10% increase in the average level of concern associates with a 0.15% reduction in 
the average level of Tobin’s Q. The economic impact of increasing or decreasing irresponsible behavior, 
although significant according to these results, might be lost. More importantly, our peer dummies 
indicating irresponsible behavior are significantly positive at the 5% and 10% levels; those for responsible 
behavior are insignificant. Firms shifting into the top quintile of irresponsible behavior (Peer dummy 5 
(concern)) incur an associated increase in firm value of 3%, as measured by Tobin’s Q, not an 
economically insignificant effect. 
To further address the potential feedback between firm performance and CSR, we regress a 
restricted version of the first differenced estimator in equation (12). We restrict our sample to firms that 
did not experience a change in their CSR level in t with respect to t–1, but did experience a change in 
their peer group in t with respect to t–1. Therefore, we now eliminate all firms that experienced a change 
in their CSR profile, eliminating the effect of CSR on value. Due to the reduced sample, we had to drop 
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our peer dummies. Alternatively, we constructed dummy variables capturing a positive or a negative 
change in any peer group in t with respect to t–1. The dummy variable Pos.∆strength takes the value of 1 
if a firm experiences a lift in peer groups for strength, Neg.∆strength is 1 if a firm experiences a drop in 
peer groups for strength, Pos.∆concern is 1 if a firm experiences a lift in peer groups for concern (more 
concern relative to other firms), and Neg.∆concern is 1 if a firm experiences a drop in peer groups for 
concern (less concern relative to other firms). Accordingly, a significant result for any of the peer change 
dummy variables would indicate that firm value is sensitive to changes in the perception of firms.  
The results presented in model 10 of Table VII are consistent with our previous findings that the 
dummy variable indicating a reduction in concern peer groups (Neg.∆concern) is significant and negative 
at the 5% level. This suggests that firms that move into lower concern quintiles experience a reduction in 
value of around 3%, even though they did not change their CSR profile at all. The results indicate that a 
change in a firm’s CSR with respect to other firms could affect firm value, even if the firm did not alter its 
actual level of CSR.  
D. Alternative Measures of Performance 
As discussed previously, the inherent structure of CSR undermines the link between costs and 
financial returns. CSR benefits might accrue several periods after the initial outlay or only once 
investment reaches a critical mass. As such, one of the reasons we employed Tobin’s Q as a dependent 
variable was to mitigate this issue. For model 11 of Table VII, the dependent variable is ROA. We must 
stress that the mechanism driving our peer dummies is dependent on the market’s ability to perceive CSR 
relative to other firms in the market. Investors constructing portfolios are unlikely to impact a firm’s 
ROA. It is likely that, if the relative level of CSR were to affect a firm’s ROA, stakeholders would be the 
major mechanism. Similar to investors constructing their portfolio based on thresholds, stakeholders 
might also engage or shun firms based on acceptable levels of CSR, which are determined relatively (it is 
unlikely that an activist group would picket every firm that has environmental concerns; rather, the most 
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abhorrent offenders would be targeted). Turning to our results, we find that concern is highly negatively 
associated with ROA at the 1% significance level, similar to the expectation in the literature. Meanwhile, 
peer dummy 5 for strength is negative and significant at the 5% level, indicating that high levels of 
responsible behavior could affect performance. It is conceivable that the costs of maintaining levels of 
responsible behavior at a sufficiently high level to be considered best in class would impose a significant 
financial burden on the firm. Finally, peer dummy 3 for concern is significant and positive at the 5% 
level. The result would indicate that firms who engage in average levels of irresponsible behavior are able 
to extract the additional benefits associated with concern behavior, perhaps without incurring the costs 
associated with being considered worst in class. The results indicate that relative standing is important 
even when considering traditional performance measures, although not as pronounced.  
E. Awareness 
Servaes and Tamayo (2013) document that CSR’s impact on value is dependent on the customer 
awareness of a firm. Firms with greater customer awareness extract the most benefit from engaging in 
CSR, while firms with low customer awareness receive no benefit or even incur penalties. Although we 
already control for advertising intensity throughout our study (and as a result for customer awareness15), 
we now attempt to explicitly examine whether conditioning firms over awareness affects our findings. We 
divide our sample in two over the median industry-adjusted advertising intensity for each year end t. We 
treat the firms falling below the median as low awareness firms (up to the 50th percentile) and those 
falling above the median (50th percentile and above) as high awareness firms. Just over 8,000 firm year 
observations include advertising expenditure. After dividing this sample in half and taking into account 
the lagged nature of our peer dummies and the construction of sales growth, each sub-sample includes 
                                                 
15  Servaes and Tamayo (2013) show that a firm’s public profile and media coverage is empirically linked to 
advertising expenditure. Advertising intensity is therefore an appropriate measure of customer awareness and we 
follow their proxy.  
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around 2,500 firm year observations.16 Table VIII documents the results of customer awareness: model 1 
presents the regression results for the sub-sample of firms classified as low awareness firms, while model 
2 presents the results for firms classified as high awareness firms. Both models present the pooled OLS 
findings of equation (6) over each of the sub-samples. Again,  Tobin’s Q is the dependent variable and we 
include the vector of control variables, year and industry-fixed effects, and cluster standard errors at the 
firm level.  
<PLEASE INSERT TABLE VIII NEAR HERE> 
Model 1 indicates that firms with low levels of strength suffer a discount of firm value (peer 
dummy 2) if they have low customer awareness, while average to high levels of concern (peer dummy 3 
through peer dummy 5) are positive and significant. Conversely, firms with high levels of customer 
awareness (model 2) tend to have an associated increase in firm value if they have relatively high levels 
of strength (peer dummy 4 and peer dummy 5), but they see no associated benefit with concern behavior. 
Our results in part reflect the findings of Servaes and Tamayo (2013) who find that the value of CSR is 
associated with high awareness firms; however, we fail to find evidence that irresponsible behavior is 
associated with a reduction of value for high awareness firms. This contrasts with their findings that high 
awareness firms are penalized more for concern behavior, when in fact our concern variable is positive 
and significant for high awareness firms. More interestingly, they document that low awareness firms 
experience little, if no negative association, with value when considering CSR. We have similar results 
for firms engaging in low levels of strength; however, our results indicate that moderate to heavy relative 
levels of concern behavior are positively associated with firm value for firms with low levels of customer 
awareness. We contend that responsible behavior is most affected by information asymmetry and search 
                                                 
16 Due to the small samples and large number of controls in our models the power of a fixed effect model is reduced, 
we do not report the fixed effect regression results for parsimony. In short, for the low awareness sample the FE 
approach increases the significance of our findings, while the findings for the high awareness sample become 
insignificant. 
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costs. As a result, firms that spend the most resources on communicating their brand and their positive 
contribution to society will ultimately gain the most benefit from engaging in responsible behavior. 
Importantly, it seems that only firms that outclass their peers in strength activities reap the benefits 
associated with communicating their message in that CSR is only advantageous when a firm is perceived 
as “good” (having significantly higher levels of strength than its peers). Firms that do not communicate 
their CSR quality to the public risk financial penalties. Our results seem to suggest firms that engage in 
below average levels of responsible behavior, and have a low level of awareness, are penalized. 
Furthermore, our results suggest that obscure firms are able to extract benefits from irresponsible 
behavior.17  
 
IV. Discussion and Conclusion 
We show that responsible behavior and irresponsible behavior impacts firm value positively when 
considered in a relatively sense. Our results indicate that the relative CSR standing of firms may be 
integral to understanding CSR’s impact on firm value. We find that above average to high levels of 
responsible behavior are associated with increased firm value, while average to low levels of responsible 
behavior are not significantly correlated with value. More importantly, we find that moderate to high 
levels of irresponsible behavior are associated with increased value. Irresponsible behavior could enhance 
firm value as firms unconstrained by restrictive CSR policies are not precluded from the advantages some 
irresponsible activities present. Alternatively, a significant shareholder presence of ethical investors 
(pension funds, etc.), could deter management from engaging in risky projects or exploit certain 
opportunities, if these activities are regarded as socially irresponsible. In either case, irresponsible 
behavior, although risky, would ultimately increase the volatility of discounted future cash flows and as a 
                                                 
17 It is important to note that our sample is restricted and that the power of the models will be reduced.  
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result entice less risk-averse investors. As a result, some investors might construct portfolios to capture 
the increased volatility, driving part of the peer effect that we observe.  
Following Gormley and Matsa (2013), we argue that CSR activities are in part endogenously 
determined by a firm’s environment, which differs across firms in observable and unobservable ways. We 
show that accounting for these firm-specific characteristics could bias the correlation between CSR and 
firm value. We find that our peer dummies are robust to the inclusion of firm fixed effects in contrast with 
the absolute level of CSR.  
Our findings suggest that the industry-specific relationship between CSR and firm value should 
be considered carefully going forward. These relationships change significance levels and signs across 
industries for absolute CSR levels. Alternatively, our peer dummies provide results that are more 
consistent. The presence of consumers within an industry and the importance of marketing and projecting 
a reputation presented in previous studies are perhaps key to this discrepancy. We find that a firm’s 
relative standing is particularly important when considering the impact of awareness on the relationship 
between CSR and value, as the benefits of CSR are only reaped if firms ensure that they outclass their 
peers and communicate their CSR profile in line with Servaes and Tamayo (2013). Finally, we advocate 
against the use of an aggregate absolute CSR measure. Our results underscore the understanding that 
“doing the right thing” and “doing the wrong thing” are not perfect opposites. We contend that the 
complexities of CSR necessitate caution. 
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Figure 1. Market approximation of firms’ level of CSR. The figure attempts to illustrate how investors and possibly stakeholders 
perceive CSR, the impact of which undermines the relationship between CSR and firm value. Market participants have difficulty 
perceiving a firm’s actual CSR due to information asymmetry, opacity and costs associated with CSR information. We contend that 
instead they classify firms into groups with similar levels, based on their perception. Therefore, a change in a firm’s actual level of CSR 
would only affect perception and, by extension, impact firm value, if the firm happens to move into a different grouping. Investors’ and 
stakeholders’ ability to perceive firm movement within groups is limited, reducing the incremental impact of CSR on firm value. 
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Figure 2. Distribution of CSR scores. These figures illustrate the distribution of percentage Net-CSR, strength, and 
concern scores over the pooled sample, spanning calendar years 1991 to 2009. The scores presented are transformed 
from binary points used by KLD and instead represent a percentage of possible points obtained. Formally, our 
aggregation takes the following form:    
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  is the aggregated CSR score for category j in year t. Similarly,          
  is equal to 1 if 
the firm meets strength s in category j, otherwise 0;         
  is equal to 1 if the firm meets concern r in category 
j, otherwise 0. 
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Table I 
 Sample Size by Year 
This table shows the number of firms included in the study assessed by KLD for each calendar year from 1991 to 
2009. 
Year Number of Firms 
1991 546 
1992 556 
1993 548 
1994 546 
1995 554 
1996 561 
1997 563 
1998 565 
1999 573 
2000 561 
2001 991 
2002 1,002 
2003 2,728 
2004 2,802 
2005 2,783 
2006 2,732 
2007 2,702 
2008 2,597 
2009 2,655 
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Table II 
KLD’s ESG Descriptive Statistics 
The table presents the descriptive statistics of the Net-CSR, strength, and concern scores for each of KLD’s ESG 
categories as well as the overall score. The scores presented are transformed from binary points used by KLD and 
instead represent a percentage of possible points obtained. The statistics are calculated on the pooled sample, 
spanning calendar years 1991 to 2009. 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Pooled 
Net 26,565 -0.02 0.06 -0.40 0.34 
Strength 26,565 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.49 
Concern 26,565 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.51 
Community 
Net 26,565 0.01 0.11 -0.61 1.00 
Strength 26,565 0.03 0.09 0.00 1.00 
Concern 26,565 0.02 0.07 0.00 0.75 
Corporate Governance 
Net 26,565 -0.05 0.17 -1.00 0.75 
Strength 26,565 0.04 0.09 0.00 0.75 
Concern 26,565 0.08 0.14 0.00 1.00 
Diversity 
Net 26,565 -0.04 0.22 -0.67 0.88 
Strength 26,565 0.07 0.12 0.00 0.88 
Concern 26,565 0.11 0.16 0.00 0.67 
Employment 
Net 26,565 -0.03 0.16 -0.80 0.83 
Strength 26,565 0.05 0.11 0.00 0.83 
Concern 26,565 0.08 0.12 0.00 0.80 
Environmental 
Net 26,565 -0.01 0.10 -0.83 0.60 
Strength 26,565 0.02 0.07 0.00 0.80 
Concern 26,565 0.03 0.10 0.00 1.00 
Humanity 
Net 24,915 -0.01 0.07 -0.75 1.00 
Strength 24,915 0.00 0.04 0.00 1.00 
Concern 26,565 0.02 0.08 0.00 1.00 
Product 
Net 26,565 -0.03 0.15 -1.00 0.75 
Strength 26,565 0.02 0.07 0.00 0.75 
Concern 26,565 0.05 0.13 0.00 1.00 
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Table III 
Financial Descriptive Statistics 
The table reports the descriptive statistics for the pooled sample spanning calendar years 1991 to 2009. (‘000) 
indicate figures presented in thousands and (%) indicate figures in a percentage or ratio. EBIT is earnings before 
interest and tax, ln(Total Assets) is the natural logarithm of total assets, ln(Turnover) is the natural logarithm of 
volume to shares outstanding, leverage is total liabilities over total assets. 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Adjusted Price 26,562 $28.66 $58.06 $1 $3,561 
Adjusted Shares (’000) 26,562 204,401 588,845 372 22,900,000 
Average Monthly Volume (’000) 26,562 1,317,066 5,372,910 189 484,000,000 
Market Capitalization (’000) 26,562 $5,925,838 $19,900,000 $5,831 $602,000,000 
Tobin’s Q 26,160 2.00 1.80 0.34 56.98 
ln(Total Assets) 26,166 7.43 1.72 3.89 12.14 
ln(Turnover) 26,562 1.65 1.09 -4.43 7.74 
Book to Market (%) 25,503 55.45 43.63 4.41 275.77 
EBIT to Assets (%) 26,149 6.80 11.91 -50.20 35.64 
Cash to Total Assets (%) 26,162 16.03 20.01 0.00 99.95 
Leverage (%) 26,098 57.46 27.83 0.21 771.17 
R&D over Sales (%) 26,057 8.99 39.25 0.00 331.75 
CAPEX over Total Assets (%) 26,166 4.49 5.35 0.00 29.38 
Advertising over Sales (%) 8,694 3.35 7.05 0.00 332.23 
Sales Growth (%) 25713 49.35 264.45 -98.85 2153.13 
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Table IV 
Shift in CSR Scores Over Time 
    The table reports the yearly average CSR score of Net-CSR, strength, and concern for calendar years 1991 to 2009. Panel A 
reports the yearly averages for 1991 to 2000, as well as the average for that decade. Panel B reports the yearly averages for 
2001 to 2009, as well as the average for that nine-year period. 
Year Net Strength Concern 
Panel A: 1991–2000 
1991 0.01 0.04 0.03 
1992 0.01 0.05 0.04 
1993 0.00 0.06 0.06 
1994 -0.01 0.05 0.06 
1995 0.00 0.06 0.06 
1996 0.01 0.06 0.04 
1997 0.00 0.06 0.06 
1998 0.00 0.06 0.06 
1999 0.00 0.06 0.07 
2000 -0.01 0.06 0.07 
Average 0.00 0.06 0.06 
Panel B: 2001–2009 
2001 -0.01 0.04 0.05 
2002 -0.02 0.04 0.06 
2003 -0.02 0.02 0.04 
2004 -0.03 0.03 0.06 
2005 -0.03 0.02 0.05 
2006 -0.03 0.03 0.06 
2007 -0.03 0.03 0.06 
2008 -0.03 0.03 0.06 
2009 -0.03 0.03 0.06 
Average -0.03 0.03 0.06 
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Table V 
Relationship between CSR and Firm Value 
The table reports the regression coefficients for the relationship between firm value and CSR from calendar year 
1991 to 2009. Models 1, 3, and 5 present the pooled OLS results, while models 2, 4, and 6 present the panel fixed 
effect results. Models 3 and 4 include peer dummies to account for any potential market trenches or clientele 
effects. Models 5 and 6 interact each of the industry dummies, defined by two-digit SIC codes, with strength and 
concern. Industries are defined as manufacturing (SIC codes 20–39), transportation (SIC codes 40–49), finance 
(SIC codes 60–67), and services (SIC codes 70–89). Peer dummies 2 to 5 indicate a firm’s peer group. Peer 
groups for both strength and concern are calculated at the end of each year t-1 for each industry j and take the 
value of 1 if a firm falls within that peer group in that year or 0 otherwise. Peer dummy 1 represents firms with a 
score of zero (dropped as it is the most prevalent), peer dummy 2 represents firms in the 40th percentile and 
below, peer dummy 3 represents the 40th through 60th percentiles, peer dummy 4 represents the 60th through 
80th percentiles, and peer dummy 5 represents the 80th and above percentiles. Size = natural logarithm of total 
assets; Leverage = total liabilities over total assets; Turnover = natural logarithm of average monthly volume over 
shares outstanding at the end of each year t; return on assets (ROA) = earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) to 
total assets; Advertising = advertising expense over sales; research and development (R&D) = R&D expenditure 
over sales; capital expenditure (CAPEX) = CAPEX over total assets; and Sales Growth = change in sales at time t 
with respect to t–1 We control for year fixed effects, industry fixed effects, and cluster standard errors at the firm 
level, the results are not reported. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Strength 2.487*** -1.911*** 1.702*** -1.991*** 2.378*** -1.958** 
 (0.390) (0.630) (0.434) (0.660) (0.486) (0.817) 
Concern 0.488 0.240 0.0470 -0.0560 0.736 0.0366 
 (0.305) (0.349) (0.316) (0.323) (0.453) (0.511) 
Size -0.151*** -0.824*** -0.140*** -0.803*** -0.150*** -0.822*** 
 (0.0226) (0.0757) (0.0236) (0.0750) (0.0224) (0.0752) 
R&D 1.596*** 0.475*** 1.708*** 0.325* 1.594*** 0.473*** 
 (0.142) (0.161) (0.150) (0.169) (0.141) (0.161) 
Leverage 0.00902 -0.0848 0.0280 -0.0831 0.0261 -0.0559 
 (0.187) (0.153) (0.197) (0.140) (0.186) (0.153) 
Turnover 0.0663*** 0.262*** 0.0558*** 0.240*** 0.0634*** 0.262*** 
 (0.0197) (0.0261) (0.0203) (0.0266) (0.0197) (0.0263) 
CAPEX 0.463 0.436 0.462 0.248 0.523 0.466 
 (0.463) (0.495) (0.470) (0.472) (0.463) (0.491) 
Advertising 3.438*** 0.791 3.281*** 1.063 3.369*** 0.613 
 (0.882) (1.183) (0.865) (1.124) (0.873) (1.201) 
Sales Growth 0.440*** 0.215*** 0.413*** 0.190*** 0.439*** 0.212*** 
 (0.0589) (0.0433) (0.0599) (0.0409) (0.0585) (0.0429) 
ROA 6.176*** 3.340*** 6.619*** 3.758*** 6.128*** 3.344*** 
 (0.468) (0.420) (0.468) (0.363) (0.466) (0.419) 
(Continued) 
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Table V-Continued 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Peer dummy 2 (strength)   -0.0373 -0.0337   
   (0.0647) (0.0533)   
Peer dummy 3 (strength)   0.0574 0.0170   
   (0.0438) (0.0363)   
Peer dummy 4 (strength)   0.135*** 0.0946**   
   (0.0437) (0.0442)   
Peer dummy 5 (strength)   0.130*** 0.0604   
   (0.0498) (0.0493)   
Peer dummy 2 (concern)   0.00887 -0.0145   
   (0.0422) (0.0350)   
Peer dummy 3 (concern)   0.153*** 0.0889**   
   (0.0505) (0.0380)   
Peer dummy 4 (concern)   0.136*** 0.0910***   
   (0.0447) (0.0351)   
Peer dummy 5 (concern)   0.120** 0.126***   
   (0.0481) (0.0434)   
Strength * Transport industry dummy     -2.140*** 1.919* 
     (0.804) (1.126) 
Strength * Financial industry dummy     -1.151** 1.354 
     (0.575) (1.003) 
Strength * Services industry dummy     5.021*** -4.996 
     (1.826) (4.053) 
Concern * Transport industry dummy     1.031** 2.143*** 
     (0.524) (0.698) 
Concern * Financial industry dummy     -0.130 -0.142 
     (0.486) (0.621) 
Concern * Services industry dummy     -2.816** -1.838 
     (1.138) (1.294) 
Intercept 2.357*** 7.570*** 1.802*** 7.409*** 2.341*** 7.555*** 
 (0.148) (0.626) (0.150) (0.614) (0.148) (0.626) 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm effects No  Yes No  Yes No  Yes 
Adj. R2 0.35 0.24 0.36 0.25 0.35 0.24 
N 13643 13643 13317 13317 13643 13643 
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Table VI 
Industry-Specific Examination 
The table examines the intra-industry relationship between CSR and firm value. For parsimony we repeat models 3 and 4 from Table V across the four industries 
we examine. Industries are defined as manufacturing (SIC codes 20–39), transportation (SIC codes 40–49), finance (SIC codes 60–67), and services (SIC codes 
70–89). All models include the set of control variables used in the study, but for parsimony we have excluded them here. We control for year fixed effects, industry 
fixed effects, and cluster standard errors at the firm level, the results are not reported. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Variable 
Manufacturing  Transportation  Financial  Services 
1 2  3 4  5 6  7 8 
Strength 1.990*** -1.500*  0.241 -0.830  -0.0020 -0.510  5.378** -7.320* 
 (0.551) (0.792)  (0.681) (0.511)  (0.274) (0.450)  (2.494) (3.897) 
Concern 0.0700 0.149  1.056** 0.171  0.134 -0.436**  -0.948 -1.032 
 (0.477) (0.484)  (0.413) (0.244)  (0.194) (0.199)  (1.094) (1.027) 
Peer dummy 2 (strength) -0.168 -0.0929  0.0672 0.0197  0.0317 0.0149  0.0422 0.342 
 (0.114) (0.0879)  (0.0608) (0.0447)  (0.0325) (0.0255)  (0.661) (0.506) 
Peer dummy 3 (strength) 0.0458 -0.0274  -0.0019 0.0300  0.0354 0.00716  0.0179 0.0510 
 (0.0638) (0.0604)  (0.0632) (0.0292)  (0.0293) (0.0219)  (0.170) (0.109) 
Peer dummy 4 (strength) 0.156** 0.0649  0.0737 0.0521  0.0405 0.0221  0.0998 0.191 
 (0.0759) (0.0749)  (0.0714) (0.0334)  (0.0372) (0.0274)  (0.124) (0.119) 
Peer dummy 5 (strength) 0.0480 -0.0219  0.0486 0.0342  0.0200 0.0361  0.312 0.317* 
 (0.0766) (0.0714)  (0.0757) (0.0355)  (0.0339) (0.0328)  (0.192) (0.184) 
Peer dummy 2 (concern) 0.0548 -0.0105  0.0444 0.0187  -0.0225 -0.0104  0.0650 0.120 
 (0.0733) (0.0520)  (0.0491) (0.0298)  (0.0348) (0.0225)  (0.143) (0.153) 
Peer dummy 3 (concern) 0.193** 0.109*  0.150** 0.0117  0.00706 0.00961  0.200 0.0683 
 (0.0864) (0.0590)  (0.0589) (0.0387)  (0.0334) (0.0259)  (0.149) (0.162) 
Peer dummy 4 (concern) 0.186** 0.0845  0.107* 0.0249  -0.0521* -0.0118  0.353** 0.223* 
 (0.0740) (0.0561)  (0.0570) (0.0336)  (0.0291) (0.0153)  (0.157) (0.132) 
Peer dummy 5 (concern) 0.233*** 0.165**  0.0280 0.0438  -0.0243 -0.00985  0.241 0.134 
 (0.0888) (0.0710)  (0.0745) (0.0492)  (0.0389) (0.0261)  (0.147) (0.129) 
Intercept 2.262*** 8.134***  1.666*** 2.528***  1.645*** 3.073***  2.432*** 11.39*** 
 (0.244) (0.755)  (0.260) (0.394)  (0.129) (0.561)  (0.447) (1.509) 
Control Variables Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year Effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Firm Effects No Yes  No Yes  No Yes  No Yes 
N 6460 6460  1531 1531  3289 3289  2037 2037 
adj. R2 0.29 0.28  0.27 0.29  0.52 0.23  0.40 0.35 
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Table VII 
Additional Specifications for Robustness 
The table reports additional specifications to increase robustness. Models 1 through 4 incorporate quadratic terms to account for any curvilinear relationship between 
firm value and CSR. Strenght^2 is the square of the firm’s strength score while concern^2 is the square of a firm’s concern score. Models 5 through 8 incorporate lagged 
terms of a firm’s strength and concern scores. The t-1 lagged strength score of a firm is L1.strength and the t-1 lagged concern score of a firm is L1.concern. Models 9 
and 10 present the first differenced estimator results, where a change in our dependant variable, ∆Tobin’s Q, is modelled as a function of a change in our control 
variables and various CSR measures. We restrict the sample in model 10 to only include firms who did not experience a change in their CSR level in t with respect to t-
1, but did experience a change in their peer group in t with respect to t-1. Pos.∆strength is a dummy variable taking the value of one if a firm experiences a lift in peer 
groups for strength. Neg.∆strength is a dummy variable taking the value of one if a firm experiences a drop in peer groups for strength. Pos.∆concern is a dummy 
variable taking the value of one if a firm experiences a lift in peer groups for concern (more concern relative to other firms). Neg.∆concern is a dummy variable taking 
the value of one if a firm experiences a drop in peer groups for concern (less concern relative to other firms). All models include the set of control variables used in the 
study, but for parsimony we have excluded them here. We control for year fixed effects, industry fixed effects, and cluster standard errors at the firm level for all models, 
the results are not reported. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
Variable 
Curvilinear  Lags  First difference (∆)  ROA 
1 2 3 4  5 6 7 8  9 10  11 
Strength 4.292*** -0.698 3.282*** -1.132  2.049*** -1.324** 2.272*** -1.030**  -0.202   0.3648 
 (0.729) (0.905) (0.853) (0.894)  (0.425) (0.530) (0.437) (0.518)  (0.399)   (3.226) 
Concern 1.417** 0.503 0.228 -0.0411  -0.425 -0.105 -0.169 0.0534  -0.567***   -10.130*** 
 (0.575) (0.537) (0.548) (0.496)  (0.330) (0.283) (0.338) (0.283)  (0.214)   (2.845) 
Strength^2 -8.086*** -5.083 -5.690** -3.423           
 (2.468) (3.109) (2.425) (2.819)           
Concern^2 -3.236* -0.785 -0.401 0.132           
 (1.719) (1.939) (1.454) (1.910)           
L1.Strength      0.332 -0.837* -0.890 -1.949**      
      (0.436) (0.484) (0.634) (0.776)      
L1.Concern      1.015*** 0.675** 0.516 -0.118      
      (0.311) (0.294) (0.470) (0.496)      
Peer dummy 2 (strength)   -0.0548 -0.0386    -0.0364 -0.0125  0.0138   -0.9806 
   (0.0653) (0.0530)    (0.0647) (0.0545)  (0.0303)   (0.7117) 
Peer dummy 3 (strength)   0.0285 0.00776    0.0668 0.0574  -0.0337   -0.1699 
   (0.0460) (0.0347)    (0.0460) (0.0432)  (0.0254)   (0.2932) 
Peer dummy 4 (strength)   0.0879** 0.0796**    0.152*** 0.159***  0.0212   -0.3030 
   (0.0404) (0.0406)    (0.0487) (0.0580)  (0.0277)   (0.3153) 
Peer dummy 5 (strength)   0.0611 0.0398    0.166** 0.176**  0.00809   -0.768** 
   (0.0541) (0.0447)    (0.0648) (0.0776)  (0.0398)   (0.3882) 
(Continued) 
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Table VII -Continued 
Variable 
Curvilinear  Lags  First difference (∆)  ROA 
1 2 3 4  5 6 7 8  9 10  11 
Peer dummy 2 (concern)   0.00812 -0.0136    0.000236 -0.0117  -0.00298   0.1687 
   (0.0416) (0.0346)    (0.0438) (0.0379)  (0.0275)   (0.3367) 
Peer dummy 3 (concern)   0.150*** 0.0887**    0.137** 0.0902**  0.0572**   0.5591** 
   (0.0492) (0.0382)    (0.0554) (0.0433)  (0.0279)   (0.2838) 
Peer dummy 4 (concern)   0.133*** 0.0903***    0.113** 0.0950**  0.0587**   -0.2770 
   (0.0409) (0.0336)    (0.0523) (0.0477)  (0.0266)   (0.3007) 
Peer dummy 5 (concern)   0.113** 0.125***    0.0761 0.135*  0.0653*   -0.3126 
   (0.0456) (0.0424)    (0.0691) (0.0714)  (0.0350)   (0.3558) 
Pos.∆strength            0.0325   
            (0.0325)   
Neg.∆strength            -0.00427   
            (0.0342)   
Pos.∆concern            -0.00783   
            (0.0255)   
Neg.∆Concern            -0.0799**   
            (0.0404)   
Intercept 2.287*** 7.554*** 1.779*** 7.408***  1.916*** 7.456*** 1.816*** 7.425***  0.0241*** 0.0308  3.6272 
 (0.151) (0.627) (0.153) (0.615)  (0.145) (0.613) (0.153) (0.614)  (0.00738) (0.0209)  (4.4258) 
Control Variables Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes 
Industry effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes 
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes 
Firm effects No Yes No Yes  No Yes No Yes  No No  Yes 
N 13643 13643 13317 13317  13375 13375 13317 13317  10771 4303  15901 
adj. R2 0.35 0.24 0.36 0.25  0.36 0.24 0.36 0.25  0.14 0.13  0.25 
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Table VIII 
  
Awareness and CSR 
The table documents the differences between firms considered as high awareness firms against those with low 
awareness, as proxied by advertising expenditure. We divide our sample in half over the median industry-adjusted 
advertising expense for each year end t. Model 1 present the results for firms with industry adjusted advertising 
expenses below the median, while model 2 reports the results for firms above the median. All models include the set 
of control variables used in the study, but for parsimony we have excluded them here. Tobin’s Q is the dependant 
variable in both models and we control for year fixed effects, industry fixed effects, and cluster standard errors at the 
firm level for all models, the results are not reported. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. 
Variables 
Low awareness  High awareness 
  1   2 
Strength 1.3161  2.2569* 
 (1.0476)  (1.1861) 
Concern 0.0259  1.9201** 
 (0.8028)  (0.8822) 
Peer dummy 2 (strength) -0.4011**  -0.1736 
 (0.1975)  (0.1927) 
Peer dummy 3 (strength) 0.0452  0.0159 
 (0.1188)  (0.1053) 
Peer dummy 4 (strength) 0.0852  0.2347** 
 (0.0847)  (0.1154) 
Peer dummy 5 (strength) 0.1181  0.3060** 
 (0.1202)  (0.1315) 
Peer dummy 2 (concern) -0.0222  0.0174 
 (0.0952)  (0.1295) 
Peer dummy 3 (concern) 0.2577**  0.1142 
 (0.1274)  (0.1362) 
Peer dummy 4 (concern) 0.2777**  0.1409 
 (0.1223)  (0.1375) 
Peer dummy 5 (concern) 0.1963*  -0.0359 
 (0.1163)  (0.1443) 
Intercept 1.7557***  2.2855*** 
 (0.3486)  (0.3719) 
Industry effects Yes  Yes 
Year effects Yes  Yes 
Firm effects No  No 
N 2672  2323 
adj. R2 0.302  0.338 
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